Standing in 303 Creative

by Elise Spenner

Beyond substantive disagreements with the Court’s rulings, critics of the sitting justices raised secondary concerns in the waning days of the recent term: Why did some of these cases make it onto the Court’s docket in the first place? Was there actually an injury to be settled, or was there just a political and ideological battle to be won? And had the Court properly handled the factual record in the case, if there was one? 

These are important questions to ask. Because lawsuits are frequently discovered or manufactured to produce an ideological victory at the Court, it is more imperative than ever to have an independent understanding of the standing doctrine that dictates when the justice can hear a case. 

One such case with a contentious standing debate was 303 Creative LLC v. Colorado, in which the Court ruled that Colorado’s anti-discrimination law violated a designer’s right to free speech by requiring her to design an expressive website for a same-sex couple. 

In an effort to break through the echo chambers on matters of standing and the factual record, I’ll break down the justiciability arguments in 303 Creative below.

The facts: Lorie Smith owns 303 Creative LLC, a website and graphic design company in Colorado. Colorado’s anti-discrimination law (CADA), established in 1957, prohibits companies from withholding or denying their services to a person based on any part of their identity (race, sex, color, and, importantly, sexual orientation). Smith argued that the law violated her free speech rights, because it required her to create expressive and promotional websites for same-sex weddings — in violation of her religious beliefs. Smith didn’t cite a particular instance in which she had to make a website for a same-sex couple; instead, she spoke to the damages she would inevitably incur when she refused to do so. 

Why many are skeptical that Smith had standing: Smith was never actually forced to make a website for a same-sex couple; likewise, she never refused to do so, and never faced the legal consequences of refusing to do so. As a result, she didn’t experience an injury in the way that we typically think of it — compelled speech, monetary loss, etc. As Justice Neil Gorsuch didn’t hesitate to admit in his opinion, Smith sued “to clarify her rights.” Needless to say, seeking clarification isn’t the most persuasive argument in favor of advancing a case with profound implications for LGBTQ+ equality across the country. But that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s not a legally sound argument.

Why the Court didn’t actually think twice about standing: In 303 Creative LLC, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent raised or addressed concerns about standing. That’s because First Amendment cases operate under unique standing doctrine. A plaintiff can bring a case in the form of “pre-enforcement” — before a law is enforced, they can sue to protect their would-be suppressed speech. However, these future injuries cannot be “imaginary or wholly speculative” and they must be imminent, rather than hypothetical. According to the appeals court, Smith would face immediate ramifications if (and when) she refused to design a website for a same-sex couple, meeting the requirements for pre-enforcement standing. Justice Gorsuch merely assumed that Smith had standing, adopting the appeals court’s reasoning. 

The other complication: The day after Smith sued Colorado, a request was filed for 303 Creative to help design invites, placemats, and a potential website for a gay couple. But an investigation found that the man who was credited with submitting the form didn’t do so, and is straight. In 303 Creative’s brief before the Court, the request was cited as an example of the imminent harm Smith would face, proving her concerns were actual and not just hypothetical. But the request didn’t actually seem to impact the Court’s analysis of standing. If anything, the faux request just created additional ambiguity in a case with an already-paper thin record.

United States v. Texas (and a visit to the Court)

by Elise Spenner

The Court handed four opinions down today, including a significant victory for the Biden Administration’s immigration policy in United States v. Texas, and I was lucky enough to be in the building when it happened. I’ll break down Texas below, but I’ll also take a second to share a bit about my experience inside the Court.

Coincidentally, I happened to be in DC for a journalism program, and headed out around 8:30 a.m. in the hopes of snagging a spot at the Court to hear the justices announce opinions. I was the last person to receive a yellow ticket (shown on the right) that guarantees you a spot in line. It was a rainy day, which probably boosted my chances of getting in and made up for my late arrival. However, despite my golden (literally) ticket, I still wasn’t actually cleared to enter. The security guards announced that only the first 30 tickets would gain entry — I was ticket #40 — but I stayed in line on the off chance that they would let a few more guests sneak in.

By 9:30, I somehow was in. We deposited all bags and electronic devices into lockers before entering the courtroom, although I brought a pen and notebook along — more for the aesthetic than for any practical reasons. Naturally, I was seated in the very back, directly behind the justices’ clerks. The building was stunning and magisterial, of course, but I was equally excited to see the press corps gathered in the left corner of the room, including Nina Totenberg, Marcia Coyle, and Joan Biskupic. Just before 10, the justices entered the courtroom to the tune of “oyez, oyez, oyez,” although Justice Neil Gorsuch was absent. Chief Justice John Roberts immediately announced that Justice Barrett had written and would read the first opinion of the day. Notably, the justices did not wait 10 minutes before proceeding to the next opinion. After Barrett finished reading the syllabus and the holding, Kavanaugh announced his two opinions, and Thomas closed the session with the fourth opinion of the day. 

I’m still desperate to sneak my way into an oral argument session, but it was stunning to see the justices in real life, and fascinating to observe the Court’s in-person procedures. Read on for my analysis of United States v. Texas. 

United States v. Texas:

In United States v. Texas, the Court held 8-1 that Texas and Louisiana lacked standing to challenge the Biden Administration’s immigration-enforcement guidelines. The Court did not reach the merits question of whether the guidelines were too narrowly focused on specific noncitizens (terrorists and dangerous criminals, for instance). In other words, Texas and Louisiana wanted “the Federal Judiciary to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policy so as to make more arrests,” as Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote for the majority. 

To put it simply, that isn’t a request that the states can bring before the Court, Kavanaugh concluded. The only justice who disagreed was Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote a solo dissent.

For this case, it’s important to focus on two key components of standing: The defendant has to suffer an injury, and the injury must be “legally and judicially cognizable.” The states easily surpassed the first hurdle, claiming that the federal government’s refusal to address noncitizens will raise costs for Texas and Louisiana. But Kavanaugh found they failed to meet the second standard because it is not an injury that can be used to challenge the policy before the Court.

Why? According to historical precedent, only the person being prosecuted has standing to challenge arrest and prosecution policies. For anyone else, the executive branch has “enforcement discretion.” Basically, the judiciary has no general authority over who the government chooses to arrest. For one, this is true because choosing not to arrest someone does not violate their liberties in any way; as a result, courts don’t need to step in to protect anyone. More to the point, it is impractical — and more likely, impossible — for the Executive Branch to arrest everyone that commits a crime. The Executive Branch has to make hard decisions based on a multitude of factors that the judiciary isn’t really equipped to question.

Kavanaugh distinguished this case from five other situations where a plaintiff could challenge the federal government’s prosecution authority:

  1. When plaintiffs sue the government for violating their rights under the equal protection clause.
  2. When Congress itself waives the redressability requirement and authorizes courts to hear cases brought by plaintiffs who suffer from under-enforcement.
  3. When the Executive Branch completely ignores the statute and refuses to make arrests or bring prosecutions.
  4. When a plaintiff makes a broader claim that doesn’t just relate to a non-enforcement policy — for example, they challenge how the Executive Branch handles legal benefits.
  5. When a noncitizen challenges a policy that keeps them detained after their arrest.

Because the challenge in United States v. Texas doesn’t check any of those boxes, Kavanaugh concluded that the plaintiffs lack standing.

Justices Gorsuch and Barrett both filed concurring opinions; they reached the same conclusion, but for a different reason. They ignored the question of a “judicially cognizable interest” and focused on a different component of standing known as redressability. In his concurrence, Gorsuch poked holes in Kavanaugh’s arguments against the injury element of standing, reminding Kavanaugh of the monetary injury suffered by the states, and the fact that in other cases, states have been given special privileges to challenge regulatory failure. After dismantling Kavanaugh’s claims, Gorsuch addressed what he saw as the real problem: the Court couldn’t do anything to redress the injury because of a congressional statute that prevents federal courts from enforcing or enjoining immigration laws. This statute foreclosed any potential relief that the Court could provide, he concluded. Barrett took a similar stance, claiming that Kavanaugh’s standing claims rest on shaky ground. The Court “weaves together multiple doctrinal strands to create a rule that is not only novel, but also in tension with other decisions,” she wrote.

Alito dissented, arguing that the Court draws an arbitrary line to reach its conclusion on standing, preventing lawsuits that challenge “arrest and prosecution policies” but not other suits against the Executive Branch. Alito found that Texas and Louisiana suffered a direct, not indirect, injury because of the Biden Administration’s policy. In failing to address this injury, Alito wrote, the Court undermines federalism because it gives States no way to seek relief for harms inflicted.

Interview: Brad Snyder

by Hannah Saraf

Professor Brad Snyder teaches constitutional law, constitutional history, and sports law at Georgetown Law. He is the author of the books Democratic Justice: Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Making of the Liberal Establishment  and The House of Truth: A Washington Political Salon and the Foundations of American Liberalism, alongside many law review articles. Prior to teaching, Professor Snyder worked as an associate at Williams & Connolly LLP and wrote two critically acclaimed books about baseball. A graduate of Duke University and Yale Law School, he clerked for the Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

What were you like in high school? Were you already interested in the law or civics? 

In high school, I aspired to be a sports writer at The Washington Post. I was very into my high school newspaper, writing mostly about sports, until I started writing about news and other things. But then I was also covering high school sports for other newspapers, like the local paper. So I really thought I wanted to be a journalist when I was growing up. In fact, I did become a journalist after college, and it was actually covering and seeing my first Supreme Court oral arguments in a case involving the National Football League where I realized that I was doing the wrong thing, that I was covering sports, but I was much more interested in writing and thinking about the Supreme Court. In that moment, I knew I needed to go to law school and that I should stop writing about sports for a living and start thinking hard about constitutional law. 

That’s such a great story! Were there any teachers that served as big mentors or role models for you in high school, college, or law school?

In eighth grade, I had a really great US Government teacher, and he made us write our first term paper using mostly secondary sources. But, I just sort of remember vividly that my paper was about Ulysses S. Grant and the Civil War. I remember using William McFeely’s book on Grant, which was probably the best biography on Grant at the time. Just going through that process of making an argument on each section of a paper made a big impact on me. 

Then in high school I had a fabulous AP US History teacher, and she really taught me about historiography. She brought in a professor from the University of Maryland who taught us about the historiography of slavery. You know, I thought of these things as just a bunch of facts and didn’t realize that there were so many different historians who disagreed about the history of slavery in the United States. I got to see one historian write “X” and then the next historian write “Y” and the next historian write “Z.” Through this, I really got to see history as a conversation among historians, and that was kind of a lightbulb moment for me. I learned not just about history as a collection of facts, but about historiography and history as a collection of arguments by different scholars. 

You’ve already answered this question a little bit, but could you expand on how covering the Supreme Court inspired you to study law? 

I was working for the Baltimore Sun at the time, and I really thought, after covering that Supreme Court case, “I’m going to go to law school, and I’m going to be the next Anthony Lewis or Linda Greenhouse.” Anthony Lewis covered the Supreme Court when I was younger and really showed the world that journalists should write about the Supreme Court in a very knowledgeable but very accessible way. He wrote one of my all time favorite books, Gideon’s Trumpet, and I had read that book about the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). I wanted to be able to write about the Supreme Court in that way, both from having that J.D. background, but in a way where a person without a J.D. could understand it. I think in some ways, I’m still trying to do that. I’m trying to write books that speak to different scholars but also speak to an audience of nonlawyers and nonscholars. Just to tell a good story so that people will keep turning the page and will want to read more about why an individual or a group of individuals or a case may have fascinated me and why it might fascinate them. 

You ended up clerking for Judge Dorothy W. Nelson. What was that experience like, and what did that opportunity teach you?

It was amazing. Judge Nelson taught me a lot of things. I could go on and on and on about her. She’s still alive. She’s still a force of nature. She still read my most recent book, and she’s in her 90s, and still has boundless energy.

Judge Nelson taught me there was a way to disagree without being disagreeable. And she was an incredible coalition builder on the Ninth Circuit. I used to call her “tea and cookies” diplomacy, She would set out a tray of cookies. She would ask people to have tea or something to drink, and she would sit in her office. She taught me that the law didn’t always have to be this adversarial, at each other’s throats kind of process. And that even if somebody might be more liberal or more conservative, you could find some common ground in figuring out the best interpretation of the law. And she is just a wonderful person with wonderful stories, and just a great mentor to me. She also was one of the first women dean’s at a top 25 law school, at the University of Southern California School of Law. She hired Erwin Chemerinsky, the great constitutional law scholar, at USC. So she really showed me, also, how fulfilling an academic life could be, and that the life of a law professor could be just such a rich one. She is still just a great exemplar and role model for me, and a mentor, and somebody whose opinion I value very much. 

It was a wonderful year, and I’d also neve lived in Los Angeles before, and I really loved living in Los Angeles. It was such a great place to live and just a fun year. And I just feel so lucky to have clerked for her and to have clerked on the Ninth Circuit, and clerked in that courthouse with so many talented judges, but also with other talented clerks. Not just in my own chambers — both of them were super talented — but also all the law clerks in the other chambers who I got to know really well. And that was a part of the richness of the experience, that I got to rub shoulders with all these great judges, just to meet them on a personal level was really neat. And I learned a lot also about appellate advocacy, and about the quality of appellate advocacy. I had this idea that everybody who argued for the Ninth Circuit was the best possible appellate advocate, and that often wasn’t the case. The caliber of advocacy really varied depending on who was arguing, and it was rich. It was a fun time.

I got more confident in areas of law that I didn’t know a lot about. There were certain areas of law that I didn’t feel as confident in, and being a law clerk forces you to become more of a generalist. I’ll never forget having to write a memo about immigration law which I knew nothing about, and we called one of my friends who was clerking for one of the judges who was an expert on immigration law. I just wanted to make sure I wasn’t screwing it up. There was a lot of importance as a law clerk in getting it right. It was not really about liberal or conservative, but about: Did you get the law right? And did you apply the law right? That was a big concern for me, no one wants to make a mistake in a memo to a federal judge. And so there was a big premium on getting it right — and not with a political valence. And that was really refreshing to me, too.

Let’s go back to this: Why were you writing books about baseball? Just because you loved sports journalism? 

My first book was basically my college honors thesis rewritten into a narrative. So my honors thesis in college was about the Homestead Grays, the Major League baseball team that played in Washington D.C. And I thought it would make a good book if I rewrote it into more of a story than I wrote the thesis as. So I did that in the nine months after I was done with my clerkship, actually, and then I worked at a law firm for a few years. 

And I’ve always, ever since I was a sports writer, wanted to write a book about Curt Flood, and his fight for free agency in professional sports. And I thought he was a lot like Clarence Earl in Gideon’s Trumpet, this kind of “one man takes on the establishment” story. I kind of pitched it as baseball’s version of Gideon’s Trumpet and while Gideon wins and Flood loses, he ultimately opens the door for other people. And it was in the course of writing that Curt Flood book that I started to use the justices’ papers for the first time.  Harry Blackmun’s papers had just opened up at the Library of Congress and other historians told me, “The journalists have mined the papers for everything they can about Roe v. Wade, you should come down,” and I went down, and I was really hooked. I mean, Blackman was a pack rat; he saved everything. He even saved slips of paper from Potter Stewart that said “Reds 3 Mets 2” in a World Series playoff game while they were on the bench. 

His papers were really rich, and it just showed me a different way of looking at a Supreme Court case and how an opinion develops based on the drafts and the correspondence and the conference notes, and everything else that are in the justices’ papers. I got kind of hooked on using those primary sources and then the justices’ papers as a way to write and think about constitutional law and have really been doing it ever since. 

As you said, a lot of your work comes with a focus on the individual work and lives of specific justices or clerks. Why have you focused on the personal stories of the law world?

That’s a great question. I think I’m really interested in how people network and create networks. People like Oliver Wendell Holmes and his clerks, and how Felix Frankfurter in selecting clerks — they were known as secretaries at the time — really was able to create this network of liberal lawyers entering government service and those impacts on American law. So I am interested in those personal stories. I think it’s partly because of my storytelling background as a journalist, but I’m also interested in how those individuals are more able to promulgate their ideas. 

I agree. I’m not a theorist. I’m not a constitutional theorist in the way that John Hart Ely and Alexander Bickle and Bruce Ackerman were and are, but I am interested in how different people are able to promulgate their ideas and multiply those ideas across space and time. I’m interested in the way Holmes and Brandeis influenced Frankfurter and really how Frankfurter influenced a whole other network of people. It’s like throwing a stone into a pond, so it’s not just their individual stories, but how what they stood for, and who they worked with, have influenced a bunch of other people.

In telling those stories, how do you make sure that they’re digestible? That they’re rich and nuanced for legal experts, and also understandable for everyone else?

It’s hard. I mean, first of all, I have non-lawyers read the book, in addition to having my lawyer friends read the book. But I also just don’t want to bore the reader. I feel like if I’m bored, then the reader is bored. And so I always ask myself: “Can I make this divergence into this person’s story? Or am I going to interrupt the flow of the narrative? Can I introduce this minor character? How many paragraphs can I spend more on that person’s life, in summarizing that person’s life, before I move on with the story?” And I think those are the kind of decisions that any writer struggles with, not just a lawyer, but I just try not to be boring and keep people interested. 

I do think people are interested in how people achieved greatness and how people got to where they are. And so some of the background stuff is interesting, but not too much background. And I think the cases, too, you want to put the people front and center. Who are the litigants, who are the lawyers? How are their lives affected by the case? Instead of just, “What was the court’s holding?” and “What was their reasoning?” To try to make it read less like a law school case brief and more like an interesting narrative that somebody’s willing to read. 

You’ve told a lot of stories about different people in the legal world. What made you so interested in Justice Frankfurter?

I graduated from law school in 1999. And probably a year and a half after that, some of my friends were clerking on the Supreme Court of the United States. I had one over for dinner that night with my family. And he got up in the middle of dinner, and he said, “I have to go.” I said, “What do you mean?” “I have to go,” he said. “I have to go back to work.” And this was obviously late November of 2000, when the 2000 election was hanging in the balance, and my jaw hit the floor. 

I was really so disappointed that the Supreme Court chose to intervene in the 2000 presidential election and write the opinion that became known as Bush v. Gore. I had really lost faith in the Supreme Court as an institution, and believed that the Supreme Court had really involved itself in what was essentially a political decision and one that was reserved to the state of Florida, on how to count its votes. And the Supreme Court’s rationale in Bush v. Gore was an equal protection rationale that the Court said was good for this train only. Well, that’s not how the Court operates. Right. The Court writes decisions of general applicability, and it’s not like a boxing referee in an arena just raising one side’s hand or the other. And I just lost my faith in the institution. 

So flash forward a couple of years later; I was writing my first law review article about the Rosenberg case. And a lot of people who follow the Court closely were really upset with the court’s refusal to take the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and to hear that case on the merits. They heard it at the 11th hour right before the Rosenbergs were executed, but Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black, in particular, argued to their colleagues that the Court should have taken the case from the get go and Frankfurter wrote a dissent after they’d been executed, and he wrote that “History has its claims.” He was speaking to his law clerks and to his former students who were either litigating before the Supreme Court or working in the Solicitors General Office.

He was basically telling them, “Don’t lose faith in the rule of law. We got this one wrong, but don’t lose faith.” And in many ways. Frankfurt’s philosophy of judicial restraint started to speak to me after Bush v. Gore and after another case called City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997, in which the Supreme Court eviscerated Congress’s power to enforce the 14th Amendment. Those two decisions really showed me that the Supreme Court was becoming too powerful, and that it was aggrandizing its own power at the expense of the other branches of government, as well as the states. And that the Court really believed in this false idea that it had the last word on the Constitution. 

I think Felix Frankfurter’s life and career really speak to those things. He was that liberal nominee to the Court in 1939, perceived to be this conservative villain when he goes on the Court, and certainly by the 40s and during the Warren Court years, as this villain of the Warren Court. But I think he recognized that the Warren Court was a liberal aberration, and that the Supreme Court of the United States is an inherently conservative, backward-looking institution that relies on a lot of precedent in history to decide cases, so by necessity, it’s going to be backward-looking. He was encouraging people to try to solve their problems through the state and federal Democratic political process. And that spoke to me after Bush v. Gore

So I thought, “Has Felix Frankfurter fallen so out of favor, this justice of liberal judicial restraint, that no judicial biography had been written about him?” So I decided that I would write it. And since Bush v. Gore — there are several decisions — since Shelby County v. Holder gutted the Voting Rights Act, since the Court tried to chip away at the Affordable Care Act, and since the overturning of Roe v. Wade, I think Felix Frankfurter’s reputation looks a lot different in 2023 of the set than it did in 1975, when William Brennan was in his ascendancy, when he was the leading justice on the court. And he was sort of the champion of judicial supremacy, and this idea that liberals could always cobble together five votes on the Court. And those days are gone, and they’re not coming back. And so now I think liberals are starting to recognize that, and Frankfurter’s ideas about judicial restraint have some purchase in 2023.

Did you uncover any unexpected things while writing the book? 

I did. One thing that really interested me that I uncovered was that there were two very prominent Jewish figures in America — Arthur Hays Salzburger, who was the publisher of the New York Times, and Henry Morgenthau Sr., — who let it be known to President Roosevelt not to nominate Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court in 1939 because they were worried about the rising tide of anti-semitism, both in Europe with the rise of Hitler, but also in the United States of America. And that Frankfurter’s nomination would instigate more anti-semitism, and that really was jaw-dropping for me. And likewise, that same crowd of people was advising Roosevelt not to let more Jewish immigrants into the country when the Nazis were invading Europe, and that also was surprising to me.

Those were two big ones. I’d say my best find in terms of documents was related to Frankfurter’s best or favorite law clerk, Alexander Bickle. He was a big-time constitutional theorist at Yale. He coined the phrase, “the counter majoritarian dilemma.” Bickle was Frankfurter’s law clerk during the 1952 term, the first time that Brown v. Board of Education was argued. Sadly, Bickle died in 1974 of cancer, and I kept thinking to myself, “If I could only have a conversation with Alexander Bickle about Frankfurter as I’m writing the book.” And I went to the FDR library and found Joseph Lash’s work, who edited Frankfurter’s diaries and wrote up a 100-page biographical sketch in 1975 arguing the Frankfurter became uncoupled from the locomotive of history given how liberal the Supreme Court was — it’s a great essay. 

But Lash had done a bunch of interviews, and he had notes, and shortly before Bickle died of cancer in 1974, he had done an interview, and those notes were preserved in the FDR library. And it was basically a transcript of everything Bickle said, and I felt like he was speaking to me from the grave about Justice Frankfurter. It really helped me think hard about different points of Frankfurter’s life, and I kept going back and reading that interview over and over again, almost like I was calling people from the dead. But reading that interview was almost like speaking to him from the dead or hearing him speak to me from the dead. And it really was an incredibly helpful document to me.

What’s your favorite anecdote about Justice Frankfurter?

I’m going to kind of answer your question. I have a couple. But one of my favorite anecdotes about Justice Frankfurter is this: In 1948, he hired the first African American law clerk at the Supreme Court, a man named William T. Coleman, who became Gerald Ford’s Secretary of Transportation. And Coleman’s co-clerk was Elliot Richardson, who was his best friend from Harvard Law School. Richardson became Nixon’s Attorney General during the Watergate Saturday Night Massacre. And one day, the Supreme Court cafeteria was closed, and the law clerks decided to go to the Mayflower Hotel for lunch. And at the last minute, Elliot Richardson, who again was best friends with Bill Coleman said, “Hey, Bill, I’ve got too much work, let’s go eat at Union Station nearby.” And Elliot Richardson did not have too much work. Frankfurter did not work his clerks that hard.

But the Mayflower Hotel did not serve black customers in Washington D.C. in 1948. Union Station was the only place in Washington D.C., because it was owned by the federal government, where a black person and a white person could have a meal together, and it wouldn’t be illegal. And Frankfurter, when they came back from that lunch, had tears in his eyes because, of course, he understood what Richardson was up to. And then, more than that, I was really struck by this memo that Bill Coleman had written Frankfurter at the end of his clerkship about graduate school segregation cases that were coming up before the Supreme Court. The NAACP was suing the southern states that had all-white law schools but no law school for black students, and tried to admit black students in the state of Texas, for example. And Coleman wrote this really detailed and passionate memo to Frankfurter about the case that I really think helped Frankfort to think about the case. In fact, I know it did, because Frankfurter passed along the memo to several subsequent clerks and even to Bickle himself when he was clerking for Frankfurter.

So it was incredibly influential for Bill Coleman to break barriers, kind of as the Jackie Robinson of Supreme Court Clerk, and overcome all kinds of discrimination, but also, the way he was able to provide a perspective that Frankfurter wouldn’t have otherwise had about separate but equal and about how to defeat the separate but equal doctrine. And at the end of his clerkship, Frankfurter wrote a letter to Bill Coleman, and he said, “I bet on you.” And, of course, it was a good bet. Because as I said, Bill Coleman became, I think, the second black member of a presidential cabinet.

What’s your favorite piece of serious wisdom from Justice Frankfurter?

My favorite piece of serious wisdom is that people shouldn’t seek social and economic change at the Supreme Court of the United States, that trying to affect change through the Supreme Court is a fool’s errand, and they should invest themselves in the democratic political process. I mean, think about if people worked as hard on trying to elect US senators and US congresspeople and engage themselves as much in the legislative process, as they did in following Supreme Court cases. I just think that trying to seek change through the Supreme Court is fool’s gold. It’s evanescent, and I think Frankfurter was right about that, that the way to create more permanent lasting change is through laws, that it’s much harder to overturn a federal law, for example, than it is to overturn a Supreme Court decision based on the Constitution. 

Yeah, people are feeling that one right now, for sure.

Yeah. In a post-Roe universe, they’re feeling that one. 

Is there anything else you think that young people should know about Justice Frankfurter?

He was really fearless, Hannah. As a young lawyer, he was willing to take risks and to take on powerful people. He took on the Attorney General of the United States, A. Mitchell Palmer, over the conduct of the Palmer Raids, the round up and deportation of radical immigrants that was led by a Young Justice Department official named John Edgar Hoover. And he, along with a bunch of other people, signed a document accusing A. Mitchell Palmer of unconstitutional conduct. He championed the idea that Sacco and Vanzetti had not received a fair trial and took on not just the Massachusetts trial judge, but the State Supreme Court of Massachusetts. He took on the anti-semitic president of Harvard College who wanted to institute a 15% quota on Jews at Harvard. He took these people on; he was willing to stand up for what he believed in, and yet, became a Supreme Court justice. 

I think sometimes people say, “Well, the way to get ahead is not to do controversial things.” I think Frankfurter stood up for what he believed in and was willing to take on fights, even if he lost some of those fights. And he did — Sacco and Vanzetti were executed, A. Lawrence Lowell found another way of reducing the amount of Jewish students, namely geographic diversity, and a lot of people did get deported by A. Mitchell Palmer, but Frankfurter saved 17 of the 23 people he represented in a federal court in Boston. 

So I think he was willing to lose. I mean, he backed Robert LaFollette, a third party candidate, for president in 1924. Walter Lippmann, his friend and fellow New Republic contributor, said, “You’re throwing away the election.” And LaFollette said, “Walter, my interest isn’t just what happens in 1924. I care what this country looks like in 1944.” And so he was willing to also play a long game, and I think that’s a good lesson for liberals with a Supreme Court that’s stacked against it. That they should just be willing to keep fighting on all fronts, and play a long game.

One more thing I just want to say: I think Frankfort has a reputation, some of it deserved, as pedantic and thin-skinned, and as somebody who alienated some of his colleagues, but he also had a lot of really close colleagues on the bench. He was incredibly close to Robert Jackson, to John Harlan, to Harold Burton, to Owen Roberts, to Sherman Minton, and his relationship with Hugo Black is one where — I know you’ve had Noah Feldman on the podcast, and I have an utmost respect for knowing his work — I really just reject the notion that they were antagonists o scorpions. They had a lot of disagreements, but they were close. And when they needed each other, they were there for each other. And it was Frankfurter and Hugo Black in Brown v. Board of Education who were helping Earl Warren achieve unanimous results. And they were on the same side in the Rosenberg case. When Frankfurter wrote the opinion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, saying that Tuskegee had drawn its city boundaries to exclude that black voters, the first person he gave that opinion to was to his friend Hugo Black, to make sure that Black was okay with the opinion before he circulated it to the rest of the justices. So they had their ups and downs, but I don’t think they were scorpions or antagonists. I think they were intellectual adversaries but also friends.

Something that was so entertaining about Scorpions was all the tension, but sometimes I wondered if it was all played up a little bit.

Well, there was tension. Frankfurter and William O. Douglas hated each other. And it was mutual. The two people that Frankfurter hated most in his lifetime were William O. Douglas and Joe Kennedy Sr. Joe Kennedy Sr., of course, spread a lot of anti-semitic filth about Frankfurter during the New Deal. And William O. Douglas was Joe Sr.’s best friend, and they just didn’t get along when they were on the Court together. Frankfurter thought that Douglas was out to run for president first and be a Supreme Court justice second, and Douglas thought that Frankfurter was overbearing, and not half as smart as he thought he was. And they both have a point about each other. So they just clashed, and that clash became both personal and professional, and they just never could really reconcile.

So of course, there was a lot of drama. I think what Noah points out is that whenever you have four justices as smart as Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Robert Jackson, you’re going to have clashes, because they’re all really strong personalities, and they’re all incredibly brilliant. With strong personalities and brilliance, they’re going to butt heads. I just think that was inevitable. I think it’s a product, really, of their brilliance. I put those four up against any four justices that have ever served on the Court at one time. Just to have that many brilliant minds on the Court at one time was remarkable, so I think that’s why you had a lot of drama. One of my other colleagues besides Noah calls them the four prima donnas. I think that’s a really good way to describe them.

In Noah’s book, I think it said something about Douglas falling off a horse, and someone made some comment like “Oh, did Frankfurter push him?”

Yeah, I think that stuff gets played up. But I hear you. I mean, Frankfurter was from New York City. The last place he’d be in the world would be on a horse. But that’s neither here nor there. 

Well, I feel like in the Pacific Northwest, at least in Washington, there’s a particular fondness for Justice Douglas and horses.

Justice Douglas, he’s from Yakima. And he really was a champion of the outdoors. He saved the C&O canal along the Potomac River that goes all the way from Washington, D.C. out into Western Maryland. I mean, he loved to hike, he would hike very fast. He was a great outdoorsman and a great champion of the environment, and I admire him for those things. But I think Justice Douglas and Frankfurter were just so temperamentally different. Frankfurter was such an extrovert, and Douglas really was an introvert. He was not a people person. He was a little bit misanthropic. Frankfurter just loved and thrived on his interactions with people.

As someone who lives in Seattle, I think Justice Douglas really at the end of the day was just quintessential Washingtonian, Seattle freeze.

It’s so interesting that you say that. There’s a scholar that’s been working on a book about Justice Douglas for a really long time named David Denelski. I really hope he publishes it because I think it’s going to be a great book. He wrote a really great article in the Journal of Supreme Court history about how Justice Douglas got nominated to the Supreme Court, that I highly recommend if you’re interested in Justice Douglas.

You’ve written a lot of books. What does your typical writing process look like? And how do you make time for writing while also teaching?

First of all, writing is an essential part of my job. I love teaching students. I learn so much teaching constitutional law and constitutional history. But half my job is to write, and I love writing. Writing for me is like getting a good workout every day. So I try to exercise that part of my brain every single day. Even if it’s just a couple of sentences, even if it’s just adding a couple of sources to the piece of writing, I’m always thinking about, “What do I need to work on today in my writing?” 

And then one thing that I’ve learned to do, and I definitely did it for this book, was to research and write chapter by chapter. If I’m working on a chapter, let’s say I’m on court packing, and I’m totally immersed in all the sources about court packing, I’m gathering everything I can get that I need to write a court packing chapter from Frankfurter’s perspective, and then I write it up. And then I go on to the next event in 1939. It is that kind of process that helps me to get myself into the primary and secondary literature in a way that I can just kind of bang out that chapter, and go through some revisions, but not let perfect be the enemy of the good. I’m trying to get a draft in a way that I think is good enough, for now. And then keep going. Rather than rewrite and rewrite and rewrite and rewrite, because I would never get finished with the book. So that’s what I’ve tried to do on my last few books is research and write chapter by chapter.

You also teach constitutional law seminars, so I have to ask: What are your thoughts on the Court’s current ideological divide? What cases are you watching this term?

I’m watching the affirmative action case. I’m watching the 303 Creative case involving whether somebody can essentially, because of her evangelical beliefs, be exempt from the anti-discrimination laws. Does it violate her free speech in creating websites for people? So I’m interested in how those cases are going to come down. I’m pretty certain that affirmative action is not going to be constitutional any longer. What I’m interested in is, it’s going to be really difficult for the Supreme Court to enforce that decision. I think it’s going to look a lot like Engel v. Vitale, which is the prayer school case, or even to some degree Brown v. Board of Education, where the Supreme Court is going to make a pronouncement that colleges and universities are not going to be able to use race in the admissions process. And then I think it’s going to be kind of a whack a mole situation, where colleges and universities are going to change their processes in such a way that will still create diverse classes of people, maybe not taking race into account in the same way, but they’re going to, I think, successfully evade the Court’s decision. I’m interested, not just in how the cases come down, though, I’m interested in what they say. I’ve really found Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson to be a refreshing voice on the court. Her comments at oral argument about the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, I found to be both strong and much needed. And I love that she’s bringing that perspective to the group. So I’m interested to see what role she plays in advancing those beliefs about the original meaning of the 14th Amendment.

On the podcast, we’ve been focusing most of our episodes on the affirmative action cases, and we were really excited when we got a college admissions officer to talk to us about preparation for the decision.

By the way, one of the great things about Georgetown is we have a Supreme Court Institute, and they mooted both sides of that affirmative action case. Of course, I’m only allowed to go to one side’s moot so as not to violate confidentiality. But I mean, it was really spectacular to see that case mooted in the days leading up to the oral argument, and we spent most of our semester talking and thinking about the affirmative action cases in our Con Law II class. 

The interesting thing about the cases is I think it’s bigger than affirmative action. Regardless of how the case comes out, I think that the meaning of the 14th Amendment is up for grabs. And I think that transcends affirmative action. And so this is why I think that Ketanji Brown Jackson bringing the original meaning of the 14th Amendment to the forefront is so important, because the meaning of that amendment is up for grabs.

I have one final, very important question. Why do you think that young people should pay attention to the courts and engage in the law? And are there specific areas that you think it’s important for high school students to focus on?

I think it’s important for high school students to become engaged citizens. And that’s informed about how their state governments work, how their local governments work, and how the federal government works. And that’s true of all three branches — of the House and the Senate and the Supreme Court of the United States. And because, for better or worse, the Supreme Court has played such an outsize role in some of our policy debates recently, I think high schoolers need to be educated about the Supreme Court. And because the voting age is 18, they’re going to be voting in presidential elections soon, and presidents choose justices. So that part of civic education is so important so they can become informed voters, and they can just see how the Supreme Court affects their daily lives, and how the Congress and how city government affects their daily lives. And so I think it’s worth reading SCOTUSblog, or listening to the Strict Scrutiny podcast. I know that’s a favorite podcast among some of my law students and me. And, I think that kind of podcast would appeal to young people as well, because there’s a lot of humor in it.

We’re thoroughly obsessed with Strict Scrutiny. We’ve been trying so hard to bring them on our podcast.

I was on a Zoom panel with one of the members of Strict Scrutiny and then two of the others are coming to give talks at Georgetown to the faculty this year. So we feel really privileged, and they’re all great. They’re a great podcast. Those are the types of ways to get into learning about the court that don’t involve necessarily reading a Supreme Court decision. The decisions now are long, they’re technical, they’re often written by law clerks and aided by Westlaw. They’re too long. They’re too technical. And I think that’s where reading SCOTUSblog, or listening to the Strict Scrutiny podcast, or following people like Larry Tribe and other academics on Twitter, can really allow young people to begin to engage with the Supreme Court of the United States. And then they should all go to law school and apply to Georgetown!

The future of D.C.’s government

by Hugo Rosen

Photo courtesy of Wikimedia commons

Since its establishment in 1790, the District of Columbia has seen five different government structures, given rise to a Constitutional amendment, and been the subject of numerous legal questions about representation. Our license plate slogan, “End Taxation Without Representation,” expresses residents’ frustration with our limited representation in Congress.

My previous article mentioned three proposals to address this frustration: D.C. statehood, a cessation to Maryland (retrocession), and maintaining the status quo. Today, I will summarize the pros and cons of each proposal and share opinions from across the country on the best course of action. As a D.C. resident, I believe understanding the city’s unique position is crucial to developing an informed opinion, so I’ve tried to be as objective as possible in my analysis of our options moving forward.

D.C. Statehood

The D.C. Statehood plan is rather self-explanatory: It would turn the now-District of Columbia — minus a small federal area on the mall — into a state with two senators and one representative in the House. Many D.C. residents support statehood because it would solve the problem of Congressional representation. “I support statehood; when I am able to vote [representation] will be my top priority,” Lilly, a junior at School Without Walls High School in D.C., told me. Lilly is far from alone: 86% of D.C. residents voted in favor of statehood in a 2016 referendum. The House of Representatives approved a “Washington, D.C. Admission Act” in 2020 and 2021, but the bill has so far failed in the Senate, prompting D.C.’s government to create a website page supporting the proposal. 

Most Americans support the idea of representation; everyone interviewed for this article agreed that D.C.’s current political system does not provide adequate representation to district residents. The statehood plan’s main problem is not the representation it proposes but rather the power it would grant to D.C. as an entity. The U.S.’s bicameral legislature gives every state two seats within the Senate regardless of size or population. Admitting a new state invariably shifts the balance of political power in Congress, impacting national policy decisions. The fact that most D.C. residents vote Democrat and that, if admitted, we would be the most left-leaning state in the union has therefore generated significant partisan controversy and remains a major impediment to statehood.

Statehood also raises other, less partisan questions. “If DC were to gain two seats in the U.S. senate, it would build resentment, because no other urban area in the U.S. has that much representation,” said Lucas, a senior at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology in Virginia. “I’d definitely support giving their house representative voting power and allowing other states rights, but the senate seats require more thought.” D.C. is, in most senses of the word, a city. Although we have a greater population than two U.S. states, Wyoming and Vermont, so do other U.S. cities, like Philadelphia. Statehood, critics argue, would give an already powerful capital city too much influence, stifling voices in other parts of the country.

Gaining admittance to the union has been a complex and controversial process for states throughout history, and D.C. is no different. Inevitably, the D.C. statehood plan would affect the political makeup of the entire nation and so must be examined on the national level. On the one hand, statehood would give D.C. residents political parity with the rest of the country, something we do not currently have. However, adding another “slice” to the Congressional “pie” could make the other slices smaller; D.C. statehood might suppress the voices and policy objectives of our current 50 states. As of now, statehood is unlikely but remains the preferred choice of most D.C. residents.

Retrocession

Under the retrocession plan, Maryland would annex D.C., minus the small federal area, back into itself, gaining back the land it gave up to create the district in 1790. Such action has historical precedent; in 1846, modern-day Alexandria seceded from D.C. back into Virginia. Today, Alexandria residents enjoy full representation within Congress. Modern retrocession would make all D.C. residents citizens of Maryland, with all the privileges (representation in Congress) and responsibilities (taxes, Maryland laws, etc.) thereof. Max, a junior at School Without Walls High School in D.C., is a proponent of retrocession. “Although full statehood would be a better solution, waiting for a Democratic supermajority in Congress or the filibuster to be abolished is incredibly unrealistic,” he said. “[Retrocession] is an imperfect solution but I would rather have full Congressional representation than no Congressional representation, even if it means becoming a Marylander.”

Retrocession offers a middle ground between statehood and the status quo, but it has yet to generate significant support. To put it bluntly, neither D.C. nor Maryland wants to unify. According to a Washington Post-University of Maryland report, only 36% of Marylanders support the idea, while 57% oppose it. D.C. residents, who overwhelmingly favor statehood, aren’t eager either. Matthew Weitzner, a Sophomore at School Without Walls, thinks that “statehood is a better idea [than retrocession], especially because D.C. and Maryland are so different.” Mike, a junior, characterizes it as “a stupid idea.”

While statehood would have nationwide implications, retrocession would primarily affect the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia (DMV) Metropolitan area and should therefore be considered as a local issue. Although it would achieve full representation, actual implementation faces the hurdle of public opinion; various retrocession bills, the most recent introduced in 2021, have failed in Congress, and retrocession remains unlikely in the near future.

Maintaining the Status Quo (Doing nothing)

The Constitution’s District Clause gives Congress exclusive authority over “such district… as may, by cessation of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, Become the Seat of Government of the United States.” As previously discussed, the exigence of this clause was the need for a capital city outside of any state’s control, a home in which the federal government was not just a tenant but an owner. Proponents of maintaining D.C.’s current government structure argue that statehood or retrocession could disrupt the city’s ability to function as a capital. Transportation, police, and schooling would all fall under the purview of a new state with considerable autonomy and not nearly as beholden to Congress as today’s D.C.

What of representation? A central argument for maintaining the status quo (which opponents of statehood also like to use) is that D.C.’s current level of representation is adequate for its unique position in the U.S. After all, the 23rd Amendment gave DC residents a vote in presidential elections, and moving to another state for representation is always an option. Adela, a freshman at Harrison High School in New York, says she opposes D.C. statehood because “Washington D.C. is a unique place, and the capital of the USA should be unique.” Statehood and retrocession also pose some practical legal problems. The 23rd Amendment explicitly gives D.C. three electoral votes. The problem is that the statehood and retrocession plans do not eliminate the District of Columbia; they merely shrink it to encompass a small area of federal land. Under the 23rd Amendment, this tiny region would retain D.C.’s electoral votes, opening the door to a situation where the president and their family, some of the only residents in the shrunken electoral district, could cast deciding votes for themselves. Repealing this Amendment, which requires approval from 38 states, could prove challenging. 

Regardless of the challenges associated with change, most D.C. residents believe the current system is insufficient, as evidenced by the overwhelming support for the 2016 statehood referendum. Statehood, though the most widely publicized solution, is not the only one, nor is retrocession. Other options include allowing D.C. residents to vote in Maryland Congressional elections (the bonus population would earn Maryland another representative in the house) or giving full voting privileges to D.C.’s non-voting delegate, Eleanor Holmes Norton. All proposals affect different groups and different parts of the country in various ways. As the U.S. capital and home of over 700,000 people, the question of D.C. representation is important nationwide, even if the proper solution remains contentious.

Opinion Analysis: Jack Daniels v. VIP Products

by Audrey Jung

This Thursday, June 8, the Supreme Court ruled in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, siding unanimously with the whiskey brand in a trademark dispute over a chewable dog toy.

Through its line “Silly Squeakers,” pet product company VIP Products designs toys that parody popular beverage brands from Dos Equis (Dos Perros) to Stella Artois (Smella Arpaw). In 2014, the company set its sights on Jack Daniel’s with the roll-out of Bad Spaniels. The original and parody are depicted below.

Photo courtesy of jackdaniels.com
Photo courtesy of walmart.com

To note a few of VIP Products’ tweaks, the company replaced “Old No. 7 Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” with “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet,” perched a doleful spaniel over the previously unencumbered white filigree, and concocted “40% alc. by vol. (80 proof)” into “43% poo by vol.” and “100% smelly.” Quite a change.

These alterations may have elicited a few laughs, but not from Jack Daniel’s. The company sued for Bad Spaniels’ market removal, claiming it violated the Lanham Act, a centerpiece of federal trademark law. The statute bars trademark infringement, the creation of a mark likely to confuse, deceive, or cause customers to mistake it for one already in existence, and trademark dilution, any action that degrades a famous trademark’s reputation. Bad Spaniels, the whiskey company asserted, both diluted and infringed their trademark.

VIP Products countered that Bad Spaniels qualified as an “expressive work” which should receive special protection under the Rogers test. Originating from Rogers v. Grimaldi, a Second Circuit case in which actress and dancer Ginger Rogers sued (and failed) to remove her name from the film  “Ginger and Fred,” the test allows certain artistic works to bypass the infringement challenge to protect their First Amendment interests. The company also claimed protection under Lanham’s “fair use” clause that protects parody, criticism, or commentary of another’s trademark.

Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the Court, rejected these arguments. She noted that the Rogers Test has been historically applied to trademarks used solely for expressive purposes and not as “source identifiers,” where a trademark –– fulfilling its more traditional purpose –– identifies the source of its product. To illustrate this point, Kagan cited a Janis Joplin song lyric in which the artist asks for a Mercedes Benz. In this instance, the reference is expressive, and not intended to credit the car manufacturer with the production of the song. The Bad Spaniels trademark, albeit expressing a humorous message, is clearly used as a brand referencing a source, and so it must be considered under the Lanham Act. But whether the trademark causes customers to confuse the product with Jack Daniel’s is left for lower courts to decide.

Further, the Court reaffirmed that the “fair use” exception is restricted to non-commercial products. In Kagan’s words, “However wide the scope of the “noncommercial use” exclusion, it cannot include…every parody or humorous commentary.” Trademarks employing a parody to designate the parodist’s own products can not fall under this umbrella.

The concurrences espoused caution. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, warned against ready reliance on survey data as evidence of customer confusion over trademarks, recommending a close assessment of “methodology and representativeness” first. Meanwhile, Justice Neil Gorsuch, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Amy Coney Barrett concurred, expressed concern that Rogers is shaky doctrine.

As Justice Kagan iterated, the Court’s ruling is narrow, for “dog toys and whiskey [are] two items seldom appearing in the same sentence.” It’s back to the kennel for Bad Spaniels, but the fate of Rogers and other products remains in the air.

Opinion Analysis: Allen v. Milligan

by Elise Spenner

In an unexpected decision Thursday morning, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that Alabama’s redrawn congressional maps diluted the power of Black voters under Section II of the Voting Rights Act, upholding a district court injunction from last year. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh and the three liberals. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito wrote dissenting opinions. 

Some background on Alabama’s map: In 2020, a new map was created to better reflect Alabama’s growing population in response to criticism that the prior layout was racially gerrymandered. However, the redrawing looked basically like the old 2001 map, with seven single-member districts but only one majority-Black one. Three plaintiffs sued, and their cases were brought to the Court in Allen v. Milligan

You might remember that in the lead-up to the 2022 midterms, the Court left multiple redrawn maps in place despite litigation that questioned their legality. The Alabama map was one of them. To do so, the Court blocked the very same district court ruling that it now upholds, and the maps were used for the congressional election. 

For a map to violate Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, it must meet three criteria outlined in Thornburg v. Gingles.

  1. The minority group must be large enough to be a majority in a reasonable district. 
  2. The group must be “politically cohesive.” In other words, if they voted as a bloc, their chosen representative would actually be elected.
  3. The white majority votes as a bloc that suppresses minority preferences

The district court found that the Alabama situation satisfied all three requirements. 27% of Alabama’s voting age population is Black, and 92.3% of them support Black candidates, while just 15% of white voters do. 

If all three of those boxes are checked, the court engages in a “totality of the circumstances” analysis: When considering the unique history and context of the case, does the map create elections that are “equally open” to minority voters, as Section II demands?

The district court said the maps were not “equally open.” Because it was possible to create maps with two majority-black districts that followed traditional redistricting criteria, not doing so diluted Black votes.

Roberts agreed with all of that reasoning, and the bulk of his analysis was devoted to explaining why Alabama’s proposed “race-neutral” standard would be a disaster. As Roberts noted at the very start of his opinion, the case is not about the interpretation of Section II but is instead “about Alabama’s attempt to remake our §2 jurisprudence anew.” Alabama wanted the Court to overrule Gingles and the thirty years of precedent that rests on its back. Roberts refused. 

More specifically, Alabama called for a map-comparison test that would analyze the drawn map in comparison to computer simulations, offering a median benchmark. Using this test, Alabama claims that their map looks similar to the computer mock-ups, making it more palatable. Roberts shot down this proposal, arguing that “‘equal access’ to the fundamental right of voting” shouldn’t turn on computer simulations. Further, tweaking the criteria that generate the map would fundamentally alter the product, making it very hard to create uniform benchmark results. 

Roberts also nixed the parade of horribles that Alabama suggests. Ruling for the plaintiffs in this case will not lead directly to mandated proportionality (where a minority group’s elected representation must match their share of the population), Roberts concluded. Why? Because maps must still abide by the traditional constraints of redistricting, making it nearly impossible to force proportionality. Roberts pointed to Miller v. Johnson and Shaw v. Reno as evidence — two cases in which the Court found that adding an additional majority-minority district conflicted with geographical and political boundaries. Furthermore, as the United States grows less geographically segregated, it becomes even clearer when districts are created merely to manufacture proportionality. 

In other words, Roberts’ opinion wasn’t a full-throated affirmation of the Voting Rights Act; instead, it was a powerful defense of precedent, and kept the conservative majority from further undermining the landmark legislation.

Kavanaugh’s concurrence:

Kavanaugh’s concurrence largely reiterated Roberts’ points. First of all, the standard for overruling statutory precedent is higher than constitutional precedent, Kavanaugh reminded readers. Because statutory precedent can be altered through the legislative process, the Court is unlikely to be proactive, especially in cases like Gingles, where Congress has left the standard untouched for decades. Kavanaugh also separately rebuked Alabama’s arguments about proportionality, race-blind computer simulations, and the constitutionality of Section II. 

However, Kavanaugh refused to join Part III-B-1 of the Court’s opinion. In this section, Roberts endorsed “racial consciousness” when drawing maps, but distinguished “consciousness” from “predominance.” “The contention that mapmakers must be entirely “blind” to race has no footing in our §2 case law,” Roberts writes. Instead, race should be one factor in a larger analysis of the communities at hand. It’s a notable admission from Roberts, who is well-known for his claim that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”

The dissent:

From the outset of his dissent, Justice Thomas clearly established his view of the case: affirming the District Court’s ruling would be akin to mandating proportionality. Much like the Court gutted Section V of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Thomas advocated for a wholesale dismantling of Section II. According to Thomas, Section II created a “race-based right to a ‘fair’ distribution of political power” that is at odds with the race-blind intentions of the Constitution. Further, the Court’s application of Section II was “based on a flawed method of statutory construction from its inception.”

2022 Data Breakdown: Gender Diversity

by Elise Spenner

Although we are yet to receive opinions from the Court in almost 30 cases, the oral argument phase of the term has officially concluded. While we wait for opinions, I took some time to analyze the gender diversity among advocates at the Court this year.

In the October 2022 term, advocates appeared before the Court 155 times in 59 cases on the merits docket. Men appeared 117 times, while women appeared just 38 times. But many prominent advocates, especially men, argued more than one time at the Court, skewing the values above. When accounting only for unique appearances, just 20 women — 19% of the 103 total advocates — argued before the justices.

The expectation should be that every term brings more diversity and more representation to the Court, and this year’s results are dismal by that standard. This term marked a 7% drop in female representation at the Court — in the 2021 term, a somewhat uplifting 26% of advocates were women. This year’s data makes clear the lack of any intentional, ongoing effort to increase the number of women arguing before the Court. 

Many of the female advocates came from the Office of the Solicitors General, and were repeat players at the Court — more specifically, Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar argued nine times before the Court this year and Assistant to the Solicitor General Erica Ross argued three times. This repetition helps to explain the wide disparity in the portion of female litigators when analyzing total advocates versus unique advocates.

Nevertheless, it is important to celebrate and recognize the growing diversity of Prelogar’s office. This term, 40% of the advocates from the Office of the Solicitor General were women — a massive improvement from last year, when women made up just 29% of government advocates. And almost all of those women, including Masha Hansford, Yaira Dubin, and Colleen Sinzdak, had the opportunity to argue more than once before the justices.

Because the SG’s Office is a more public-facing institution and represents the government at the Court, there is more social and political pressure for the office to be diverse. The same is not true at private law firms, at public interest groups, and state government offices.

Prelogar, for one, was a constant presence at the Court this term. Because she wasn’t confirmed until late October of 2021, she argued only five times last term. But this year, she appeared nine times before the Court, and always in contentious cases (redistricting, the independent state legislature theory, affirmative action, student debt relief, immigration policy, and religious liberty, for a few). 

Unsurprisingly, Neal Katyal and Lisa Blatt each had the most appearances from a private law firm, arguing five and four times respectively. Katyal argued his 50th case this term, while Blatt reached 56. Despite leaving the reputable Kirkland & Ellis to start his own firm, Clement & Murphy, Paul Clement still argued three times before the Court, raising his lifetime total to 138 appearances.

And Judd E. Stone, Texas’s solicitor general, continued to be a mainstay at the Court. After a shocking five appearances last term as a rookie advocate, Stone argued three more times this session in United States v. Texas, Brackeen v. Haaland, and Reed v. Goertz. Stone is part of a larger — but not very diverse — group of state solicitors general and attorneys general who frequently appear before the Court. Of the 13 state advocates that argued this term, just one was a woman: New York SG Judith Vale.

One fact is painfully obvious: Law firms continue to lag behind in their efforts to diversify Supreme Court litigators. This term, just eight women from private law firms argued before the Court — 13% of the 60 total big law advocates. 

But Williams & Connolly makes clear that diversity does not come at the cost of frequent, quality advocacy before the Court. The firm sent three women to the Court — Lisa Blatt, Sarah Harris, and Amy Saharia — in seven separate cases. In other words, not only has Blatt succeeded, she has brought other women with her and used her platform to raise the bar for diversity at Williams & Connolly.

In contrast, although Hogan Lovells did represent five clients before the Supreme Court this term, every single case was argued by former Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal. Likewise, Paul Clement was responsible for all three of the clients that Clement & Murphy represented at the Court.

The paucity of female advocates before the Court does not stem from a lack of qualified and able candidates. In 2021, according to the American Bar Association, women made up 55.3% of law school students. That statistic holds true at elite institutions: 54% of Harvard Law School’s Class of 2025, and 52% of Yale Law School’s, are women. And the diversity of the Office of the Solicitor General is clear evidence that women can and will excel before the Court when given the opportunity. 

At large, however, the Supreme Court bar remains an exclusive and inaccessible stratosphere, across not only gender but racial and socioeconomic lines. Somewhere along the legal pipeline, women are discouraged — or, at the very least, not encouraged — to pursue appellate advocacy at the highest levels. We can not condone these disparities as the inevitable result of an old-fashioned, out-dated institution — the same lack of representation would not be acceptable in any other government office or corporate boardroom. There is no reason to hold the Supreme Court to a different standard.

Fourth Circuit upholds Thomas Jefferson High School admissions policy

by Elise Spenner

The fourth circuit yesterday held 2-1 that an admissions policy adopted by Thomas Jefferson HIgh School for Science & Technology (TJ), located in Virginia, does not disparately impact or intentionally discriminate against Asian American students. In writing for the majority, Judge Robert B. King overturned the district court’s decision that the policy violated the 14th Amendment, and laid the groundwork for a potential appeal to the Supreme Court at the same time as the justices deliberate in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard University, this year’s landmark affirmative action case.

According to the U.S. News report, TJ is the best high school in the country. Their curriculum includes seven foreign language programs, mobile app development classes, and DNA science and astronomy courses. The school also has 15 specialized research labs and offers activities ranging from orchestra and swing dance to a science, technology, and math journal. The latest standardized assessments found that 100% of students are proficient in math, reading, and science.

Prior to 2020, TJ followed a rigorous application process, requiring that students pay a $100 application fee, have a minimum grade point average, score highly on three standardized tests and writing exams, and submit teacher recommendations. Put simply, TJ’s process made applying to college look easy. But the resulting school demographics weren’t representative of the broader community: 71.5% of the school was Asian American and 19.5% was white in 2019; almost all of the students came from certain middle schools and wealthier socioeconomic backgrounds.

In response to both the COVID-19 pandemic and the reckoning with systemic racism in 2020, school districts around the country made changes to their admissions policies. Most prominently, the specialized schools in New York City and Lowell High School in San Francisco moved from merit-based systems to lottery-based systems following backlash. Similarly, TJ — and the broader group of Governor’s Schools across Virginia — altered their policy in a concerted effort to promote diversity.

Originally, Fairfax County Public Schools Superintendent Scott Braband brought forward a “merit lottery proposal” that would place qualified students (based on GPA) into a regional lottery. He also provided graphs that projected how the new system would alter TJ’s demographics. But this policy was not acted upon by the Board; instead, they adopted Braband’s more moderate “holistic review” measure, which still divvied TJ’s spots up to each “school division,” but selected applicants based only on grade point average, an essay, a skill sheet, and “experience factors” — special education status, English-language learner status, attendance at an underrepresented middle school, or meal-plan eligibility.

The results were profound. The class of 2025 received over 1,000 more applications, and admitted far more low-income students, more geographically diverse candidates, and more girls. But not everybody was pleased with this sea change. In 2021, the Coalition for TJ, an advocacy group of Fairfax parents, sued the County School Board, arguing that the policy unconstitutionally discriminated against Asian Americans, in violation of the 14th Amendment.

There were three main questions before the Fourth Circuit:

  1. Does the policy “disparately impact” Asian American students?
  2. Was the policy adopted with discriminatory intent? In other words, did the Board intend to harm Asian Americans?
  3. Based on our answers to 1) and 2), what constitutional standard of review should the policy face, and does the policy withstand that standard?

The district court, for one, ruled against the policy, finding that it had a disparate impact, was enacted with discriminatory intent, and thus was subject to — and failed — strict scrutiny. The district court’s reasoning went something like this:

  1. A “before-and-after comparison” showed a decline in offers to Asian Americans, demonstrating disparate impact.
  2. The set-asides for each middle school — and the advantage given to underrepresented schools — skewed the playing field unfairly against Asian Americans.
  3. The board acted hastily and without proper consideration in response to concerns about diversity.

The Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion on each question. According to Judge King, there is no specific reason why the set-asides referenced above should hurt Asian Americans — in fact, Asian Americans make up a similar percentage of the student body at both the feeder middle schools and the underrepresented ones. Although the representation of Asian Americans as a whole marginally declined, there were far more low-income and geographically-diverse Asian Americans admitted to TJ under the new policy, he said. Further, the policy can’t be discriminatory, King claims, because it is entirely race-blind. And the process took over four months, with public meetings and “target outreach,” foreclosing the argument that it was rushed. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held the policy to the relaxed standard of rational basis review, and it easily passed constitutional muster.

The opinion closes by paying homage to the Supreme Court’s recognition that diversity — and the subsequent educational benefits — is a compelling state interest. It follows, King wrote, that it is always legitimate to bring a wider variety of student backgrounds to the classroom, as TJ’s policy does. But this tenet that the Fourth Circuit took for granted stands on shaky ground — in less than two months, the Supreme Court will rule in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, with the potential to completely upend established precedent about promoting diversity in schools. In other words, TJ’s admissions policy — and the thousands of policies like it around the country — could be short-lived regardless of what the Fourth Circuit held.

A brief legal history of Washington, D.C.

by Hugo Rosen

Photo courtesy of GPA Photo Archive via Flickr

The United States of America has fifty states, fourteen territories, and one District of Columbia. D.C. operates like a state in many ways and is subject to direct congressional oversight in a manner unlike any other mainland U.S. city. Because most Americans view D.C. through its role as our nation’s capital, we often overlook the legal intricacies of the city itself and its long, complex history. In this article, I will summarize how D.C.’s relationship with the federal government and Congress throughout history has led to our current license plate slogan: “taxation without representation.” Then, in my next article, I will highlight the viewpoints of high schoolers across the country on the best structure for D.C.’s government moving forward.

Article 1 Section 8 Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution allows for the creation of “[a] district (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States.” This clause has a specific exigence: The delegates of the Constitutional Convention wanted to protect the nation’s capital, a federal area, from state politics. Four years earlier, in 1783, a group of disgruntled continental soldiers had surrounded Congress in Philadelphia’s independence hall, demanding late pay for their services. In dire straits, Congress requested aid from the Pennsylvania militia, which Pennsylvania denied, forcing Congress to flee to Princeton, New Jersey. Wishing to prevent such an event from happening again, Congressional delegates began examining the merits of a capital city ruled exclusively by the federal government. 

George Washington named D.C. as the location of the new capital in 1790 as part of a compromise with southern states. In exchange for choosing a southern-ish city (compared to distinctly northern candidates like New York or remaining in Philadelphia), southern leaders agreed to allow the newly formed national government, led by Washington, to assume revolutionary war debts, despite their concerns over growing federal power. Accordingly, the Residence Act of 1790 established D.C., an unpopulated swampland, as the nation’s capital, and the Organic Act of 1801 formally organized the territory under direct Congressional control.

The plan for D.C. provided by the Organic Act of 1801.

By 1801, D.C. had grown into a small town with permanent residents. Therefore, the Organic Act deprived D.C. residents, who were previously allowed to vote in Maryland and Virginia elections, of the ability to vote whatsoever. Even the mayor, an elected position in most cities at the time, was chosen by the president under the Organic Act’s terms — Thomas Jefferson appointed D.C.’s first mayor, Robert Brent, in 1802. Protesters immediately began to demand representation, eventually pressuring Congress to amend D.C.’s charter and create a popularly-elected mayoralty in 1820.

During this period, Washington D.C. contained four semi-independent subdivisions: Washington City, Washington County (the borders of modern-day D.C.), the independent city of Georgetown, and Alexandria Country. Alexandria Country voted for succession and was returned to Virginia in 1846 due to concerns over representation and D.C. ‘s increasingly anti-slavery attitude. The remaining three entities were united under the D.C. Organic Act of 1891, which created one district ruled by a presidentially appointed territorial government with a popularly elected “house of delegates”.This government was replaced shortly after in 1894 by a three-member, presidentially-appointed board of commissioners who ruled the city directly. Unelected rule, however, angered D.C. residents and sprouted multiple protest movements advocating for greater independence.

Proponents of D.C. independence after 1894 wanted freedom from Congressional control, the right to representation in Congress, and the right to vote in presidential elections. These rights were, and remain, inherent to statehood, making D.C.’s demands unique. Many states in the early 20th century were either reluctant to enfranchise D.C.’s growing African-American population or simply didn’t care enough to vote for change, so commissioner rule remained in effect for decades. By 1960, however, balanced proportions of Democrats and Republicans within the district generated bipartisan support for the least controversial of D.C.’s representation-related demands: voting in presidential elections. The Twenty-Third Amendment, ratified in 1961, granted D.C. “A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State.” In other words, the amendment allowed D.C. residents to vote for president like state residents, with the same proportional representation. Of course, this legislation only addressed one of D.C.’s three grievances. Nine years later, the D.C. Delegate Act partially addressed calls for representation in Congress by providing D.C. one non-voting delegate, or “shadow delegate,” to the House of Representatives. Many district residents at the time viewed this arrangement as insufficient because of their delegate’s inability to vote in the House and the complete lack of representation in the Senate, a view which persists today.

D.C. remained under unelected rule until the passage of the 1973 Home Rule Act, which provides the basis for D.C.’s current governmental structure. Home Rule means that D.C., like many American cities, has a popularly-elected mayor and City Council. However, unlike most cities, Congress retains the right to review and overturn D.C. council legislation. This has sparked many controversies over the years, the most recent being the Congressional repudiation of a D.C. crime bill in March. 

Since 2000, D.C.’s license plates have read “taxation without representation.” The D.C. government, and some individual residents, view the current status quo as untenable and continue to advocate for solutions ranging from greater mayoral autonomy to D.C. statehood. In my next article, I will discuss the perspectives of high schoolers around the country on three proposed answers to D.C.’s problems with representation: D.C statehood, cessation to Maryland (except for a small federal district), and maintenance of the current status quo. 

The case for electing state superior courts

by Maxwell Steinberg

One brisk April afternoon, I found myself on the ledge surrounding the granite sculpture in Foley Square while reading Judge Jeffrey Sutton’s 51 Imperfect Solutions, which examines how state courts can vindicate individual rights. Looking up, I saw the New York County Courthouse, and its grand Corinthian-style columns, through a changed lens, unleashing my need to learn more about America’s state court system.

State courts handle more than 95% of all cases filed in the country, determining state law claims on questions of civil liberties, the distribution of political power, and statutory interpretation. Given these stakes, the process of selecting state judges, especially at the reviewing appellate level, is crucial. Currently, only 22 states directly elect their judges, but common sense dictates that every state’s highest superior court should follow this model. This argument may seem in tension with the principle that the judicial role is counter-majoritarian and should not be subject to a partisan electorate, but supposedly merit-based selection systems risk the same consequence.

These “neutral” alternatives entail nominating commissions of lawyers providing governors with a list of candidates to choose from. Don’t let this strike you as entirely above board: Empirical evidence dating back to the 1960s makes clear that these bodies frequently break down into blocks representing the plaintiffs’ bar and defense communities, each with the distinct goal of advancing their clients’ agendas.

Even after the initial nomination, partisan politics remains inescapable. For example, Governor Kathy Hochul’s recent nomination of Hector LaSalle as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals was halted by progressives in the State Senate. Did these members argue that LaSalle, an intermediate state court’s presiding judge, lacked the experience and temperament to serve? Certainly not. Instead, they argued that Governor Hochul should have sought to reshape the court by nominating someone more progressive on criminal justice and union issues.

Some argue that elected judges become harsher on criminal defendants as November approaches, fearing negative campaign commercials. Appellate courts’ roles in determining questions of law, not guilt or innocence, minimizes this concern. Others object that judicial elections do not attract the most qualified nominees, but this rests on the assumption that merit trumps politics in unelected schemes, a notion the LaSalle debacle disproves. Finally, some assert that judicial candidates’ often minimal name recognition allows special interests to easily influence elections with massive spending. Yet, these same groups also dictate judicial selection in merit-based selection states through backdoor deals in governors’ offices and selection boards.

Protests that judicial elections have become “political” are not wrong, but they ignore that the alternatives function as placebos at best and counterproductively at worst. When it comes to state superior courts, there is no cause to replace “We the People” with “We the Legal Academy” in the Constitution’s Preamble.